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PROPORTIONAL DISCOVERY’S ANTICIPATED IMPACT AND 
UNANTICIPATED OBSTACLE 
Gregory L. Waterworth* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last hours of 2015, Chief Justice Roberts did as he has done 
each year before: he released a year-end report.1  Despite the routine 
of the reports, 2015’s seemed different.2  The report was not the 
typical recitation of case statistics and policy determinations.3  The 
report was a poetic call to action.4  It cut to the core of the adversarial 
nature of litigation by analogizing civil litigators with the duelers of 
old.5  Although not a terribly unique analogy,6 the report focused less 
on the adversarial roles of the individuals and, instead, scrutinized the 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, May 2018, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A., 
Government and Politics, 2013, University of Maryland.  A very special thank you 
to the tireless and devoted work of the University of Baltimore Law Review team and 
to the faculty that helped create this Comment.  The author dedicates this Comment 
to his loving family, friends, and dog—Norman. 
1.  JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2015), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf 
[hereinafter 2015 YEAR-END REPORT].  The tradition began with Chief Justice 
Warren Burger in 1970.  JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2009 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1 (2009), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/20 
 09year-endreport.pdf. 
2.  Compare 2015 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 1, at 13–16 (detailing the caseload of 
the federal courts), with John G. Roberts, Jr., 2003 Year-End Report on the Federal 
Judiciary, SUP. CT. U.S. (Jan. 1, 2004) [hereinafter 2003 Year-End Report], 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2003year-endreport.aspx 
(discussing the relationship between Congress and the Federal Judiciary), and JOHN 
G. ROBERTS, JR., 2004 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 2–3 (2005), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2004year-endreport.pdf 
[hereinafter 2004 YEAR-END REPORT] (outlining the federal judicial budget crisis). 
3.  Compare 2015 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 1 (discussing the 2015 amendments 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), with 2003 Year-End Report, supra note 2 
(discussing the Federal Judiciary’s budget, relationship with Congress, caseload, and 
various agencies), and 2004 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 2 (discussing the Federal 
Judiciary’s budget crisis, caseload, and various agencies). 
4.  See 2015 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 1, at 9–10. 
5.  Id. at 11–12 (“We should not miss the opportunity to help ensure that federal court 
litigation does not degenerate into wasteful clashes over matters that have little to do 
with achieving a just result.”). 
6.  See Lawyers or Modern Day Duelers, ALBION C. HIST. BLOG (Apr. 18, 2016), 
https://mhancockparmer.wordpress.com/2016/04/18/lawyers-or-modern-day-
duelers/. 
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rules that govern both dueling and litigation.7  Chief Justice Roberts 
highlighted the 2015 amendments to the rules that govern the practice 
of civil litigation, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules).8  
The 2015 Year-End Report explained how past “rules amendments 
[were] modest and technical, even persnickety,” but noted that the 
2015 amendments were different.9  They “mark[ed] significant 
change, for both lawyers and judges, in the future conduct of civil 
trials.”10  
The 2015 amendments marked an attempt by the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules (the Advisory Committee) to address the 
growing concern that “in many cases civil litigation has become too 
expensive, time-consuming, and contentious,” and that these growing 
burdens were ultimately “inhibiting effective access to the courts.”11  
A symposium, sponsored by the Advisory Committee to explore 
these concerns,12  
identified the need for procedural reforms that would: (1) 
encourage greater cooperation among counsel; (2) focus 
discovery—the process of obtaining information within the 
control of the opposing party—on what is truly necessary to 
resolve the case; (3) engage judges in early and active case 
management; and (4) address serious new problems 
associated with vast amounts of electronically stored 
information.13 
In a sense, the needed reforms flowed against the very adversarial 
nature of litigation that warranted comparison with duels.14  And if 
duelers are an apt parallel to litigators, then a litigator’s ammunition 
is rightfully the tool of discovery.15  Many contended that modern 
reliance on electronic discovery proved the language of Rule 
26(b)(1), which defines the scope of discovery, to be too broad.16  
Proponents of change believed that this broad language was the 
 
7.  See 2015 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 1, at 1–2, 5–9 (providing a discussion on 
the now-antiquated rules of dueling).  
8.  Id. at 4–9. 
9.  Id. at 4. 
10.  Id. at 5. 
11.  Id. at 4.  
12.  See infra Section II.C.1. 
13.  2015 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 1, at 4–5.   
14.  See id. at 3. 
15.  See id. at 1–7. 
16.  See infra Section II.B.  
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source of increasing litigation time and expense.17  The Advisory 
Committee agreed with the proponents of change, and after years of 
drafting and debate, a new Rule 26(b)(1) was submitted for 
adoption.18  The new Rule 26(b)(1) is but a shadow of its former 
self.19  In an attempt to curb the much debated growing costs, the new 
Rule 26(b)(1) supplanted the standards of the former rule20 with only 
two considerations—relevance and proportionality.21  
Despite the hopeful tone of the 2015 Year-End Report, it still 
looked towards the future with healthy skepticism.22  Chief Justice 
Roberts’s report continued with the tale of two Napoleonic French 
officers who dueled at every given opportunity over a fifteen-year 
period.23  The feud stubbornly persisted between the men as the 
world transformed around them, and the original slight was all but 
forgotten.24  The tale, just as the goal of the new amended rules, 
served to cut to the heart of the adversarial nature of civil justice.25  
Chief Justice Roberts concluded by calling on “the entire legal 
community, including the bench, bar, and legal academy, [to] step up 
to the challenge of making real change,”26 all while warning that 
“[w]e should not miss the opportunity to help ensure that federal 
court litigation does not degenerate into wasteful clashes over matters 
that have little to do with achieving a just result.”27 
This Comment will proceed in four parts following this 
introduction.  Part II will provide helpful information necessary to 
fully appreciate the current Rule 26(b)(1), including a brief history of 
the rules of discovery,28 an analysis of the former Rule 26(b)(1),29 the 
circumstances which fostered the calls for amendment,30 and the 
amendment process.31  Part III will detail the new scope of discovery 
by breaking down the new Rule 26(b)(1),32 discussing proportionality 
 
17.  See infra Section II.B. 
18.  See infra Section II.C.  
19.  See infra Section III.A. 
20.  See infra Section II.A.2.  
21.  See infra Section III.A.  
22.  2015 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.  
23.  Id. at 11–12 (describing Joseph Conrad’s novella, The Duel). 
24. Id. at 12.  
25.  See id. at 10–12.  
26.  Id. at 9. 
27.  Id. at 12. 
28.  See infra Section II.A.1.  
29.  See infra Section II.A.2.  
30.  See infra Section II.B. 
31.  See infra Section II.C.  
32.  See infra Section III.A.  
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in the context of discovery,33 and providing helpful examples and 
scholarship on the application of proportionality.34  Part IV will 
discuss how the courts have applied the new Rule 26(b)(1) in 
decisions since adoption,35 the problems arising out of the 
misapplication of old case law,36 and will provide a few guiding cases 
that correctly applied the new Rule 26(b)(1).37 
Lastly, Part V will review the impact of the amendment since 
adoption, explore what is being done to promote the change, and 
ultimately detail what needs to occur for the full impact of the 
amendment to be achieved.38  Ultimately, this Comment will 
conclude that the continued use of pre-2015 amendments case law to 
define the terminology of the current Rule 26(b)(1) is inapposite to 
the goal of the new proportionality standard.39  More specifically, 
such holdings—especially the definition of “relevance” in 
Oppenheimer v. Sanders—are no longer controlling over the scope of 
discovery.40  Until the higher courts provide holdings which prohibit 
further misapplication, the full potential of Rule 26(b)(1)’s 
proportionality standard will remain unknown.41  
II. THE HISTORY OF RULE 26(b)(1) 
The 2015 amendments arose out of a concern that the former Rule 
26(b)(1) could no longer control the scope of discovery under modern 
circumstances.42  Understanding these circumstances helps to 
appreciate the intended magnitude of the amendment.43   
A. Rule 26(b)(1) Before the 2015 Amendments 
As previously mentioned, many argued that the costs, time, and 
contentiousness associated with civil litigation were increasing and 
 
33.  See infra Sections III.B–C. 
34.  See infra Section III.C.  
35.  See infra Part IV.  
36.  See infra Sections IV.A–B.  
37.  See infra Section IV.C.  
38.  See infra Part V. 
39.  See infra Section V.B.  
40.  See infra Sections IV.A–B, V.B.  
41.  See infra Section V.C.   
42.  See infra Section II.B.  
43.  See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes (2015) (explaining the 
genesis of the 2015 amendments, how they relate to previous amendments, and how 
they arose at least partially out of a need to ensure proportionality in light of the 
advent and proliferation of electronic discovery). 
2017 Proportional Discovery: Impact and Obstacle 143 
 
that discovery was a cause.44  But not all agreed that a change was in 
the best interest of justice.45  An understanding of the history of Rule 
26(b)(1), the former Rule 26(b)(1), and the state of civil litigation 
under the former Rule 26(b)(1) frame the uniqueness of the 2015 
amendments.46  
 1.    A Brief History of the Rules of Discovery 
Since the passage of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,47 the 
Supreme Court has had “the power to prescribe general rules of 
practice and procedure” for the federal courts.48  In 1935, the first 
Advisory Committee was formed to draft the first set of unified rules 
governing the procedure of the courts.49  The first rules were finally 
adopted by the Court on December 20, 1937,50 and were effective on 
September 16, 1938.51  Since adoption, the Rules have ebbed and 
flowed52 to best promote the resolution of federal civil cases on their 
merits.53  
Rules 26 through 37 have controlled discovery since their 
creation.54  But the first set of rules, which took on the intensely 
challenging task of codifying the best practices from English and 
state courts for federal use,55 were understandably imperfect.56  This 
was expected, so a means of amending was also created.57  The 
 
44.  See infra Section II.B.   
45.  See infra Section II.B.  
46.  See infra Sections II.A.1–2, II.B. 
47.  28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2012). 
48.  Id. § 2072.  
49.  4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1004, at 23 
(2015). 
50.  Id. § 1004, at 27. 
51.  Id. § 1004, at 28. 
52.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes (2015).  To be exact, Rule 26 has 
been amended thirteen times since its adoption.  Id. 
53.  Bernadette Bollas Genetin, “Just a Bit Outside!”: Proportionality in Federal 
Discovery and the Institutional Capacity of the Federal Courts, 34 REV. LITIG. 655, 
656 (2015). 
54.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37; see also 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2002, at 33–34 (3d ed. 2010) (explaining that Rules 26 
through 37 “were intended to take the best of what were then modern English and 
state practices for discovery and make them available in the federal court”). 
55.  8 WRIGHT, supra note 54, § 2002, at 33. 
56.  Id. § 2002, at 34. 
57.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2012); see also How the Rulemaking Process Works, U.S. 
CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how-rulema 
 king-process-works (last visited Nov. 11, 2017) (describing the rulemaking process 
and the amendment process). 
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discovery rules underwent significant amendments in 1948,58 and 
then again in 1970.59  The 1970 amendments drastically rearranged 
the discovery rules.60  Before 1970, Rule 26 arguably only applied to 
depositions, but after amendment, any confusion was clarified, and 
Rule 26(b) took its modern place as controlling the scope of 
discovery.61  The Advisory Committee’s notes from 1970 indicated 
that Rule 26(b) now “regulate[d] the discovery obtainable through 
any of the discovery devices.”62  After taking its controlling role, 
Rule 26(b)(1) was almost amended in 1980,63 amended in 1983,64 
technically amended in 2007,65 and most recently amended in 2015.66  
While the exact nature of the amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) have 
differed, their purpose was always the same—to foster simplicity67 
and to “rein in popular notions that anything relevant should be 
produced.”68 
 2.    The Former Scope of Discovery 
 Before the 2015 amendments, Rule 26(b)(1) read:  
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of 
discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery 
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any 
party’s claim or defense—including the existence, 
 
58.  8 WRIGHT, supra note 54, § 2002, at 34.  
59.  Id. 
60.  Id. § 2003, at 35. 
61.  Id.  
62.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment.  
63.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1980 amendment (“The Committee 
has considered a number of proposals to eliminate abuse, including a change in Rule 
26(b)(1) with respect to the scope of discovery. . . .  [But] [t]he Committee believes 
that abuse of discovery, while very serious in certain cases, is not so general as to 
require such basic changes in the rules that govern discovery in all cases.”).  
64.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment (“Rule 26(b)(1) 
has been amended to add a sentence to deal with the problem of over-discovery.  The 
objective is to guard against redundant or disproportionate discovery by giving the 
court authority to reduce the amount of discovery that may be directed to matters 
that are otherwise proper subjects of inquiry.  The new sentence is intended to 
encourage judges to be more aggressive in identifying and discouraging discovery 
overuse.”). 
65.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2007 amendment (explaining 
that the Advisory Committee intended to make “stylistic” changes when it deleted 
the word “books” and moved one sentence). 
66.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. 
67.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2007 amendment. 
68.  Noble Roman’s, Inc. v. Hattenhauer Distrib. Co., 314 F.R.D. 304, 307 (S.D. Ind. 
2016). 
2017 Proportional Discovery: Impact and Obstacle 145 
 
description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any 
documents or other tangible things and the identity and 
location of persons who know of any discoverable matter.  
For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter 
relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.  
Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if 
the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence.  All discovery is subject to 
the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).69 
The former rule can be broken down into three distinct parts.70  
First, it stated that any material was discoverable as long as it was 
nonprivileged and relevant to any party’s claim or defense.71  This 
aspect of the former Rule 26(b)(1) is one of the few provisions that 
carried over into the new Rule 26(b)(1).72 
Secondly, the former Rule 26(b)(1) further provided that, “[f]or 
good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to 
the subject matter involved in the action.”73  The Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit noted that the “subject matter” standard was 
designed to distinguish basic discovery regarding claims and defenses 
from a broader scope of allowable discovery.74  The standard was 
originally included in Rule 26(b)(1) “to involve the court more 
actively in regulating the breadth of sweeping or contentious 
discovery.”75  
The third distinct part of the former Rule 26(b)(1) was that it 
defined that “[r]elevant information need not be admissible at the trial 
if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence.”76  The Supreme Court detailed 
how the “reasonably calculated” standard, while acting as a necessary 
boundary to discovery, prohibits discovery on claims and defenses 
that have been stricken.77  Originally added to Rule 26(b)(1) in 1946, 
the “reasonably calculated” standard was included by the Advisory 
 
69.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2010) (emphasis added).  
70. See infra notes 71–76 and accompanying text. 
71.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2010).  
72.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2015). 
73.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2010) (emphasis added).  This Comment will refer to this 
provision hereinafter as the “subject matter” standard.  
74.  In re Subpoena to Witzel, 531 F.3d 113, 118 (1st Cir. 2008). 
75.  Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment).  
76. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2010) (emphasis added).  This Comment will refer to this 
provision hereinafter as the “reasonably calculated” standard. 
77.  Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351–52 (1978).  Oppenheimer 
will be discussed in far greater detail later in Sections IV.A–B. 
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Committee to clarify that inadmissible evidence, such as hearsay or 
lists of potential witnesses, was discoverable.78 
In summation, the former Rule 26(b)(1) defined the scope of 
discovery as relevance to claims and defenses, defined relevance as 
anything “reasonably calculated,” and allowed the scope to be 
expanded, for good cause, to include anything relevant to the “subject 
matter” of the issue.79  But as technology advanced, so did the strain 
on the Rule first formulated in 1937.80 
B. Was Change Necessary? 
Many perceived that, just as the French Duelers fought until they 
lost sight of the cause,81 civil litigation was devolving into a never-
ending series of meaningless clashes—never resolving the original 
slight, but always delaying resolution.82  Empirical data83 supporting 
change to the scope of discovery detailed that in a closed study of 
3,550 cases,84 the median total reported discovery cost was $15,000 
for a plaintiff and $20,000 for a defendant.85  Further data revealed 
that the top 5%, or 177 cases, reported a median discovery cost of 
$850,000 for plaintiffs and $991,900 for defendants.86  Surveys 
conducted before 2010 within the Litigation Section of the American 
Bar Association, the National Employment Lawyers Association, and 
the American College of Trial Lawyers reflected a “general 
dissatisfaction” with federal civil procedure, and many of the lawyers 
surveyed responded that the rules were “not conducive to securing a 
‘just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’”87  The 
 
78.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment. 
79.  See supra notes 68–78 and accompanying text.  
80.  See infra notes 109–15 and accompanying text. 
81.  See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.  
82.  See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and 
Discovery Reform, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 703, 716 (1989).  
83.  See infra notes 84–89 and accompanying text.  Some of the cited surveys, data, and 
opinions were formulated after the decision was made to explore amending the scope 
of discovery.  Although they were not drafted prior to any notion of amending and 
they do not perfectly reflect the nature of discovery under the former Rule 26(b)(1) 
or the legal community’s opinion of the Rule, they offer reflective insight into the 
state of discovery under the former Rule 26(b)(1).   
84.  JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & COMM. ON RULES OF 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES ON 
THE 2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 3 (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites
/default/files/report_to_the_chief_justice.pdf [hereinafter 2010 DUKE CONFERENCE 
REPORT] (terminating study in the federal courts by the end of 2008). 
85.  Id.  
86.  Id.  
87.  Id.  
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corporate and defense-oriented attorneys surveyed generally viewed 
litigation costs as too high.88  And damningly, all projections 
indicated that the growing reliance on e-discovery will only increase 
costs and burdens.89  Proponents of change emphasized the data 
concerning the increasing costs and general disfavor of pre-2015 
discovery,90 but the entire legal community did not support the 
movement to amend.91 
Professor Arthur Miller, a prominent academic and former 
Advisory Committee reporter specializing in the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure,92 testified before the Senate Subcommittee on 
Bankruptcy and the Courts of the United States in opposition to 
amending the scope of discovery.93  Professor Miller argued that the 
justifications for narrowing the scope of discovery are simply 
“speculative, not empirically justified, . . . overstated,” and ignore 
other systemic values, such as access to the judiciary.94  To many, 
narrowing the scope of discovery constituted a “significant turning 
away from the vision of the original Federal Rules of a relatively 
unfettered and self-executing discovery regime—a true commitment 
to ‘equal access to all relevant data.’”95  He noted that amendments 
apply to all discovery, not just the “relatively thin band of complex 
and ‘big’ cases.”96  Professor Miller concluded that while discovery 
relating to electronically stored information is altering the sphere of 
discovery, its use by defense interests as justification to narrow 
 
88.  Id. at 4 (“The participating corporations reported that outside litigation costs account 
for about 1 in every 300 dollars of U.S. revenue for corporations not in insurance or 
health care.  The respondents also reported that the average discovery costs per 
major case represent about 30% of the average outside legal fees.”).  
89.  Id.  
90.  See discussion infra Section II.C.1.  
91.  See infra notes 92–97 and accompanying text.  
92.  Changing the Rules: Will Limiting the Scope of Civil Discovery Diminish 
Accountability and Leave Americans Without Access to Justice?: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Bankr. & the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 7 
(2013), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CHRG-113shrg89395.pdf. 
93.  Id. at 41–48 (prepared statement of Arthur R. Miller, Professor, New York 
University School of Law). 
94.  Id. at 42–43.  
95.  Id. at 43. 
96.  Id. at 45 (citing Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery 
Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REV. 683, 684–86 (1998) (reviewing studies showing 
that one-third to one-half of all litigations involve no discovery).  But cf. John H. 
Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation Reform, 
60 DUKE L.J. 547, 549 (2010) (arguing that discovery is “dysfunctional, with 
litigants utilizing discovery excessively and abusively”)).  
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discovery is just another instance of “Chicken Little crying that the 
sky is falling.  [And] [i]t is not.”97  
Proponents of change further noted that not only had the nature of 
discovery been altered, but caseloads increased as well.98  Federal 
caseloads have substantially increased, along with the variety and 
depth of subject matter.99  At the same rate, trials are becoming 
rare,100 and discovery costs are disproportionally skyrocketing for 
complex civil cases.101  One scholar concluded that the rules fostered 
a system where “discovery often serve[d] less to acquire and disclose 
information than to manipulate the opponent—to embarrass, exhaust, 
and frustrate him.”102 
C. Making Amends  
The debate within the legal community was fervent enough for the 
Supreme Court to take notice and call for the issue to be explored.103 
 1.    The Duke Conference  
Heeding the call of the Supreme Court, the Standing Committee on 
Rules of Practice and Procedure organized a symposium to explore 
issues within federal civil litigation.104  On May 10, 2010, lawyers, 
judges, and academics from across the country met to “explore the 
current costs of civil litigation, particularly discovery, and to discuss 
possible solutions” at what is now known as the Duke Conference.105  
Attendees reviewed and discussed empirical data, scholarly papers, 
and judicial programs in considering if issues existed within the 
federal civil justice system.106  The conference’s report concluded 
that “[w]hile there is need for improvement [within the Rules], the 
time has not come to abandon the system and start over.”107  
 
97.  Id. at 47.  
98.  See infra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.  
99.  See Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on 
Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 601 (2010).  
100.  See Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring 
a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 399 (2011). 
101.  See Stephen B. Burbank et al., Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 
658 (2013).  
102.  Schwarzer, supra note 82, at 713. 
103.  See infra Section II.C.1.  
104.  See 2015 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
105.  2010 Civil Litigation Conference, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies 
 /records-and-archives-rules-committees/special-projects-rules-committees/2010-civil 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2017); 2010 DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 84, at 1. 
106.    2010 DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 84, at 1.   
107.  Id. at 5.  
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Attendees faced the challenge of determining how the judiciary could 
make internal changes quickly enough to keep up with the rapid 
changes of society and proposed numerous potential changes to the 
rules, as well as determined points of consensus among the 
participants.108  
The Duke Conference focused its attention on pleadings, discovery, 
spoliation, and judicial case management.109  As for the issues in 
modern discovery, discussions “extended beyond the costs, delays, 
and abuses imposed by overbroad discovery demands to include 
those imposed by discovery responses that do not comply with 
reasonable obligations.”110  “[O]verbroad and excessive discovery 
demands,” “stonewalling,”111 “document dumps,”112 fishing 
expeditions,113 “overly narrow interpretations of . . . requests,” and 
excessive motions requiring response were all contemplated.114  In 
all, the attendees uniformly agreed that rule changes were needed.115  
The Conference’s report identified that what was “needed can be 
described in two words—cooperation and proportionality.”116  
However, a rule change alone would not suffice.117  A cultural buy-
in, supplemented by continued education, pilot programming, and 
extensive data collection were necessary to foster the needed 
changes.118 
 2.    “[F]ive years of intense study, debate, and drafting”119 
So began the lengthy process of amending the Rules.  The Duke 
Conference generated forty papers and twenty-five data compilations 
 
108.  Id. at 2, 4–5.  
109.  Id. at 5–9. 
110.  Id. at 7.  
111.  “Stonewalling” is a term used to describe the refusal to cooperate or answer 
questions as a delaying tactic.  Stonewalling, LAW DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictiona
ry.org/stonewalling/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
112.  “Document dump” is a term used to describe the act of responding to discovery 
requests with the over-production of a large quantity of data in an attempt “to hide a 
needle in a haystack.”  Document Dump Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL, 
https://definitions.uslegal.com/d/document-dump/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).  
113.  A “fishing expedition” is “[a]n attempt, through broad discovery requests or random 
questions, to elicit information from another party in the hope that something 
relevant might be found.”  Fishing Expedition, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
114.  See 2010 DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 84, at 7. 
115.  Id.  
116.  Id. at 4.  
117.  Id. at 5.  
118.  Id. at 10–12. 
119.  See 2015 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.  
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on how the expense, time, and contention inhibited the effectiveness 
of the courts in many cases.120  Following the Duke Conference’s 
suggestions, the Advisory Committee began the lengthy process of 
translating these suggestions into workable amendments to the 
Rules.121  A subcommittee presented the first drafts of proposed 
amendments in 2012.122  The Committee held public hearings in 
Dallas, Phoenix, and Washington D.C., received input from more 
than 120 witnesses, and reviewed more than 2,300 written comments 
on the proposed amendments.123  The proposed amendments further 
passed through the Standing Committee, the Judicial Conference, the 
Supreme Court, and Congress before their adoption on December 1, 
2015.124  
This change has attracted the critiques of many, and articles 
pertaining to the 2015 amendments flood scholarly reviews.125  Some 
applauded the amendments as a modern means of addressing e-
discovery,126 while others concluded that proportionality is an “anti-
plaintiff” limit to discovery.127  Despite the critiques following the 
new amendment, one thing was certain—the switch to proportionality 
review was a large step.  The only question that remained was how 
impactful would the change be? 
III. THE NEW SCOPE OF DISCOVERY 
A. The New Rule 26(b)(1) 
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is 
as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged 
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and 
proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of 
the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the 
 
120.  Id. 
121.  Id. at 5. 
122.  COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
U.S., SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 25 (2012), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/ST09-2012.pdf [hereinafter 
2012 COMMITTEE REPORT]. 
123.  2015 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 1, at 5. 
124.  Id.  
125.  See sources cited infra notes 126–27. 
126.  See, e.g., Trevor Gillum, The Convergence Awakens: How Principles of 
Proportionality and Calls for Cooperation Are Reshaping the E-Discovery 
Landscape, 23 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 741, 745 (2016).  
127.  See, e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Pro-Defendant Composition of the 
Federal Rulemaking Committees, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1086–87 (2015). 
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parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, 
the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether 
the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely 
benefit.  Information within this scope of discovery need not be 
admissible in evidence to be discoverable.128  
The new Rule 26(b)(1) can be broken into four elements: (1) the 
addition of proportionality as a key factor defining the scope of 
discovery and of six proportionality considerations; (2) the removal 
of the list of discovery sources; (3) the removal of the “subject 
matter” standard; and (4) the removal of the “reasonably calculated” 
standard.129   
The Advisory Committee notes that the new Rule 26(b)(1) restores 
“proportionality as an express component of the scope of discovery” 
to “guard against redundant or disproportionate discovery.”130  The 
change to proportionality does not place the burdens of all 
proportionality considerations on the party seeking discovery, nor 
does it permit the use of simple boilerplate objections stating that a 
request is not proportional.131  The new Rule 26(b)(1) further gives 
six factors to be considered in applying proportionality: (1) “the 
importance of the issues at stake”; (2) “the amount in controversy”; 
(3) “the parties’ relative access to relevant information”; (4) “the 
parties’ resources”; (5) “the importance of the discovery in resolving 
the issues”; and (6) “whether the burden or expense of the proposed 
discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”132  Not one of the six factors 
is inherently more impactful on a court’s analysis.133  For instance, 
monetary stakes cannot control the analysis, but must be balanced 
against the other five factors.134   
Perhaps as, if not more, striking than the addition of 
proportionality, was the removal of controlling aspects of the former 
Rule 26(b)(1).135  The first removal was the phrase providing for the 
discovery of information about documents, tangible items, and 
 
128.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).  
129.  Memorandum from Judge David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, to Judge Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on 
Rules of Practice & Procedure app. B-4 (June 14, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
 sites/default/files/st09-2014-add_0.pdf [hereinafter Summer 2014 Committee 
Report].  
130.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. 
131.  Id.  
132.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
133.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. 
134.  Id.  
135.  See infra notes 136–44 and accompanying text. 
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possible witnesses.136  The Committee saw these words as 
unnecessary because they described a “well entrenched” practice and 
made the rule verbose.137  
The Committee further deleted the “subject matter” and 
“reasonably calculated” standards.138  As for the “subject matter” 
standard, the Advisory Committee expressed that a few factors 
prompted removal.139  First, the provision was rarely invoked.140  
Second, the new proportionality standard would allow for the same 
result.141  And lastly, the removal of the “subject matter provision” 
prevented future interpretations that would extend the scope of 
discovery contrary to the intent of the amendments.142  The 
“reasonably calculated” standard was deleted because the standard 
was “used by some, incorrectly, to define the scope of discovery.”143  
Furthermore, the notes observe that “use of the ‘reasonably 
calculated’ phrase to define the scope of discovery ‘might swallow 
any other limitation on the scope of discovery.’”144   
The new Rule 26(b)(1) removed any past provisions that could 
arguably expand or redefine the scope of discovery leaving only two 
considerations: relevance to claims and defenses and 
proportionality.145  But the question remains: what is proportionality? 
B. Proportionality Is Not a Stranger to the Rules 
To begin, proportionality is not new to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.146  Many of the very considerations now provided to 
review proportionality originally resided in Rule 26(b)(1) from 1983 
to 1993.147  In 1993, the considerations were moved to Rule 
26(b)(2)(C)(iii), which directed the court to “limit the frequency or 
extent of use of discovery if it determined that ‘the discovery . . . 
[was] unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs 
of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties’ 
resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the 
 
136.  Summer 2014 Committee Report, supra note 129, at app. B-9.  
137.  Id. 
138.  Id. at app. B-9–10. 
139.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. 
140.  Id.  
141.  Id.  
142.  Id.  
143.  Id.  
144.   Id. 
145.  See id. 
146.  Summer 2014 Committee Report, supra note 129, at app. B-7. 
147.  Id. 
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litigation.’”148  While initially added to address problems of over-
discovery, redundant, or disproportionate discovery, the Advisory 
Committee Notes indicate that the proportionality considerations 
failed to have their intended effect.149  
C. So What Is It Then? 
Although proportionality is not new to the Rules, the concept 
remains elusive to the bench and bar.150  In fact, even Black’s Law 
Dictionary lacks a definition for “proportionality” in the civil 
context.151  The new Rule 26(b)(1) gives six seemingly exclusive 
factors for a court to consider when determining the proportionality 
of a discovery request.152  The factors can be inapplicable, neutral, or 
even determinative depending on the specific discovery request or 
dispute at issue.153  Moreover, each factor necessitates a factual-
intensive analysis.154  
Despite providing factors, the list leaves many ambiguities due to a 
stark lack of helpful case law concerning proportionality,155 and a 
lack of uniform guidance on reviewing cases through a proportional 
lens.156  This ambiguity as to what is actually proportionality may be 
the largest hurdle the new rule must overcome,157  but for the 
purposes of this Comment, a basic understanding of the concept is 
only necessary for determining how effective the amendment has 
been at achieving the Advisory Committee’s goals.  
 
148.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.  
149.  Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment) 
(explaining that the proportionality considerations instituted in 1983 were intended 
for the same purposes, but lacked impact). 
150.  See, e.g., David Crump, Goodbye, “Reasonably Calculated”; You’re Replaced by 
“Proportionality”: Deciphering the New Federal Scope of Discovery, 23 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 1093, 1102 (2016); Elizabeth D. Laporte & Jonathan M. Redgrave, 
A Practical Guide to Achieving Proportionality Under New Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 19, 23 (2015).  
151.  See Proportionality, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  The term is 
defined in the criminal law context as “[t]he principle that the use of force should be 
in proportion to the threat or grievance provoking the use of force.”  Id. 
152.  See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text.  
153.  Crump, supra note 150, at 1097–1101. 
154.  See id.  
155.  Id. at 1102–03.  
156.  Laporte & Redgrave, supra note 150, at 46.  
157.  See id.  However, uniformly defining proportional discovery is not the purpose of 
this Comment. 
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 1.    A Helpful Example 
A pre-2015 amendment example of proportionality in discovery 
should serve as a helpful example to illustrate the concept.  In United 
States v. University of Nebraska at Kearney,158 Judge Zwart invoked 
proportionality when reviewing the discovery requests of the 
government.159  In a discrimination case against the university for 
failure to provide housing for students with emotional assistance 
animals, the government requested any electronically stored 
information (ESI) pertaining to an extensive list of search terms.160  
The university argued that if the terms were used “the defendants 
would need to produce ESI for every person with a disability who 
sought any type of accommodation from . . . [the university], 
including students seeking academic accommodations, employees 
seeking employment accommodations, and the general public seeking 
accommodations for using . . . [the university’s] non-housing 
facilities.”161  At the time of the decision, the university had already 
spent $122,006 in processing the discovery requests, and the request 
would ultimately yield 10,997 total documents.162  In response to the 
growing costs of the discovery request, the court conducted a, then 
Rule 26(c)(2)(C), proportionality review.163  The court’s analysis 
hinged on the specific allegations in the case: discrimination by 
prohibiting emotional assistance animals.164  Although the requested 
information had relevance, the burden of obtaining the information 
“outweigh[ed] its likely benefit.”165  Accordingly, the court denied 
the government’s motion to compel discovery because the 
proportional burden outweighed the benefit.166  The court reasoned 
that other less costly discovery tools and means could be used to 
gather the information, and that the request hindered the “just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination” of the case.167 
United States v. University of Nebraska at Kearney serves as a 
good example of proportional review.168  The factors considered by 
Judge Zwart were similar to the six considerations outlined in the 
 
158.  No. 4:11CV3209, 2014 WL 4215381 (D. Neb. Aug. 25, 2014). 
159.  Id. at *3. 
160.  Id. at *1. 
161.  Id. at *2. 
162.  Id. at *3. 
163.  Id.  
164.  Id. at *5. 
165.  Id.  
166.  Id. 
167.  Id. at *7.  
168.  Id. at *3–4. 
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amended Rule 26(b).169  With a helpful pre-2015 example of 
proportionality, one can better review the cases that have looked to 
the new amended Rule 26(b) since its adoption. 
IV. THE OPPENHEIMER PROBLEM 
Proportionality is now a controlling factor over the scope of 
discovery in all future and pending proceedings, except in those 
pending proceedings where application of the new rule would not be 
feasible or would result in injustice.170  Yet, proportionality is not the 
only consideration.171  Interestingly, the hurdle Rule 26(b)(1) now 
faces in achieving its full potential comes not from proportionality, 
but from its co-consideration—relevance.172  
A. Boilerplate Beginnings 
Among the early decisions to incorporate the new Rule 26(b)(1) 
was Signatours Corp. v. Hartford on May 19, 2016.173  Signatours 
pertained to a motion to compel the production of documents in a 
copyright infringement action.174  Proportionality was not a deciding 
factor in the case.175  In fact, the concept was never mentioned except 
in the court’s quotation of the new Rule 26(b)(1).176  The failure to 
review both relevance and proportionality under the new Rule 
26(b)(1), however, is not why this Comment draws attention to the 
decision; it is the boilerplate.177  
Black’s Law Dictionary defines boilerplate as “[r]eady-made or all-
purpose language that will fit in a variety of documents.”178  The term 
boilerplate typically describes the usage of ready-made contractual 
clauses,179 but has also found a place in judicial standards of 
review.180  The practice of utilizing boilerplate standards of review is 
 
169.  See id. at *3, *5. 
170.  28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2012). 
171.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
172.  See infra notes 190–210, 265–86 and accompanying text. 
173.  No. 14-1581 RSM, 2016 WL 2930435, at *2 (W.D. Wash. May 19, 2016). 
174.  Id. at *1.  
175.  See id. at *2–5.  
176.  Id. at *2.  
177.  See infra notes 178–92 and accompanying text. 
178.  Boilerplate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
179.  See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in 
Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 
715, 718 (1997). 
180.  Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 233, 255–58 (2009).  
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widespread.181  The systemic perception of standards of review as 
boilerplate may be best exposed in one federal judge’s comments as 
he discussed the role of court clerks in drafting opinions.182  The 
judge explained that he would take a clerk’s draft and “make 
substantial revisions to almost every paragraph, and about the only 
statements of black-letter law that . . . [the judge would] leave 
untouched . . . [were] boilerplate, such as [the] standard of review.”183  
Comments like this show how many people in the legal community 
view standards of review, and similar statements of law, as 
boilerplate.184   
Although not a standard of review in the typical sense,185 Rule 
26(b)(1) is the standard for reviewing discovery requests, and thus 
the same pressures apply.186  Standard legal language is a staple of 
the law, providing balance of power, supporting judicial economy, 
and standardizing the review of cases.187  However, Signatours 
provides a clear example of the pitfall of using boilerplate.188  The 
new Rule 26(b)(1) was incorporated into the language defining the 
scope of discovery, but the case law used to explain the terminology 
was old law created under the former rule.189  Following the block 
quote of the new Rule 26(b)(1), Signatours continued by stating: 
 
181.  See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Trading Votes for Reasoning: Covering 
in Judicial Opinions, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 752 (2008) (noting that appellate 
courts often use boilerplate string citations that have been cut and pasted for the 
standard of review); Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 
B.U. L. REV. 1, 37 (2004) (highlighting the use of boilerplate standards of review in 
place of reasoned and explained analysis); Peters, supra note 180, at 255–58 
(explaining that the frequent use of boilerplate language is one of the many issues 
standards of review face). 
182.  See Arthur D. Hellman, The View from the Trenches: A Report on the Breakout 
Sessions at the 2005 National Conference on Appellate Justice, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 141, 188–89 (2006).  
183.  Id. 
184.  See id. 
185.  See generally Peters, supra note 180 (focusing on appellate standards of review and 
their misuse). 
186.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also Michael J. Miles, Proportionality Under 
Amended Rule 26(b)(1): A New Mindset, A.B.A. (May 18, 2016), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/pretrial/articles/spring2016-0516-
proportionality-amended-rule-26b1-new-mindset.html (emphasizing the importance 
of the new Rule 26(b)(1) to the discovery process). 
187.  Peters, supra note 180, at 238–41. 
188.  Signatours Corp. v. Hartford, No. 14-1581 RSM, 2016 WL 2930435, at *2 (W.D. 
Wash. May 19, 2016). 
189.  Compare Estate of Zahn v. City of Kent, No. C14-1065RSM, 2015 WL 12712764, 
at *1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 10, 2015) (applying the pre-2015 Rule 26(b)(1) as the 
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“Relevant information for purposes of discovery is 
information ‘reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery 
of admissible evidence’ . . . .”  Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. 
Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005).  
“District courts have broad discretion in determining 
relevancy for discovery purposes.”  Id. (citing Hallett v. 
Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002)).190 
The court included into the new scope of discovery the very 
“reasonably calculated” standard that the Advisory Committee 
purposely removed.191  While Signatours may have been one of the 
first decisions to do this, it has certainly not been the last.192  
B. Old Habits Die Hard 
At first glance, the use of Oppenheimer does not seem incorrect.193  
But by scrutinizing Oppenheimer, one sees that the holding is not 
simply defining the term “relevance,” but is defining “relevance” 
under the scope and language of the former Rule 26(b)(1).194  
Oppenheimer involved a class action against an investment fund for 
artificially inflated pricing and brought to the Supreme Court 
multiple questions concerning the procedure for handling class 
actions and allocating the burdens of discovery.195  One of those 
issues pertained to the class’s argument that requests to learn of more 
potential class members fell under the scope of discovery.196  The 
Court disagreed with the plaintiff class and held that requests of such 
information did not fall under discovery, but instead fell under Rule 
23(d)’s facilitation of sending notice.197  In doing so, however, the 
Court defined the scope of discovery under the 1978 version of Rule 
26(b)(1) and noted that “[t]he key phrase in this definition—‘relevant 
to the subject matter involved in the pending action’—has been 
construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that 
reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue 
 
standard of review), with Signatours, 2016 WL 2930435, at *2 (applying the same 
standard with the post-2015 amended Rule 26(b)(1)). 
190.  Signatours, 2016 WL 2930435, at *2.  
191.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. 
192.  See infra Section IV.B. 
193.  See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 350–51 (1978). 
194.  See id.  
195.  See id. at 343–44, 349–59.   
196.  See id. at 350–52. 
197.  Id. at 352–56. 
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that is or may be in the case.”198  But the “key phrase” to which the 
Supreme Court construes broadly no longer exists.199    
Judge David Campbell, in In re Bard IVC Filters Products Liability 
Litigation, succinctly explained the nature of using law which defines 
a prior version of a rule:  
Amended Rule 26(b)(1) was adopted pursuant to the Rules 
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 et. seq.  That statute 
provides that “[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be 
of no further force or effect after such rules have taken 
effect.”  Thus, just as a statute could effectively overrule 
cases applying a former legal standard, the 2015 amendment 
effectively abrogated cases applying a prior version of Rule 
26(b)(1).  The test going forward is whether evidence is 
“relevant to any party’s claim or defense,” not whether it is 
“reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.”200 
Despite the likely abrogation of the Oppenheimer standards, many 
courts continue to cite to it when defining relevance.201  The United 
States District Courts of New York,202 Florida,203 Kansas,204 
Louisiana,205 California,206 and Kentucky207 are creating a large 
 
198.  Id. at 350–51 (emphasis added) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (1976)). 
199.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
200.  317 F.R.D. 562, 564 (D. Ariz. 2016) (citation omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) 
(2012)).  
201.  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Shamesh v. CA, Inc., 314 F.R.D. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2016); 
Lightsquared Inc. v. Deere & Co., 13 Civ. 8157 (RMB) (JCF), 2015 WL 8675377, at 
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2015); La. Crawfish Producers Ass’n-W. v. Mallard Basin, 
Inc., No. 6:10-1085 c/w 6:11-0461, 2015 WL 8074260, at *2, *5 (W.D. La. Dec. 4, 
2015).  A Westlaw case search performed on November 17, 2017, revealed 293 
citations of the Oppenheimer standard in federal courts to define relevance in the 
amended Rule 26(b) since its adoption on December 1, 2015.  Albeit every case may 
not be positively citing Oppenheimer, but this is still a high number of citations to an 
abrogated holding. 
202.  A Westlaw case search performed on November 17, 2017, revealed that nineteen 
New York Federal District Court orders cite Oppenheimer to define the rule’s scope. 
203.  A Westlaw case search performed on November 17, 2017, revealed that thirty-seven 
Florida Federal District Court orders cite Oppenheimer to define the rule’s scope. 
204.  A Westlaw case search performed on November 17, 2017, revealed that twenty-three 
Kansas Federal District Court orders cite to Oppenheimer to define the rule’s scope. 
205.  A Westlaw case search performed on November 17, 2017, revealed that twenty-five 
Louisiana Federal District Court orders cite to Oppenheimer to define the rule’s 
scope. 
206.  A Westlaw case search performed on November 17, 2017, revealed that thirty-eight 
California Federal District Court orders cite to Oppenheimer to define the rule’s 
scope. 
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portion of jurisprudence that incorporates Oppenheimer into the new 
Rule 26(b)(1).208  Although the incorporation of the Oppenheimer 
standard is not facially inapposite to the amended rule, the continued 
use of old case law to define relevance is creating a hurdle in 
realizing the full impact of the new scope of discovery.209  The 
Oppenheimer definition of relevance is one that incorporates the very 
broad and liberal scope of discovery that the amendment purposefully 
removed.210   
C. Righting the Ship 
Not all courts are applying the old law to the new rule.211  One of 
the first decisions to grasp and apply the amended Rule 26(b)(1) as 
intended was Sibley v. Choice Hotels International.212  A simple bed 
bugs case fostered tremendous discovery costs due to the “continual 
bickering and litigation over minor filing deadlines, and discovery 
disputes focused on form instead of substance,” which led to “over 70 
docket entries in the case.  Presently, there are 83 docket entries, and 
the pending motions to compel and extend discovery are the tenth 
and eleventh motions interposed.”213 
The Sibley Court gave a comprehensive, but keen, description of 
the amendments to 26(b)(1) and noted that “the discretionary 
authority to allow discovery of ‘any matter relevant to the subject 
matter involved in the action’ has been eliminated.”214  The court 
then used the new proportionality standard to hold that the extensive 
discovery requests were disproportional to the needs of the case, 
denied all motions set forth for consideration, and closed written and 
document discovery.215  
When framing the new Rule 26(b)(1), the Advisory Committee 
could not have asked for a more perfect case than Sibley to support 
the necessity of decreasing the scope of discovery.216  If destined “to 
 
207.  A Westlaw case search performed on November 17, 2017, revealed that fifteen 
Kentucky Federal District Court orders cite to Oppenheimer to define the rule’s 
scope. 
208.  Combined, these states account for approximately 54% of the case law perpetuating 
the Oppenheimer standard.  See supra notes 201–07.     
209.  See discussion infra Section V.B. 
210.  See supra notes 193–200 and accompanying text. 
211.  See infra notes 212–32 and accompanying text. 
212.  No. CV 14-634 (JS)(AYS), 2015 WL 9413101, at *2, *7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2015). 
213.  Id. at *1. 
214.  Id. at *2 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2010)).  
215.  Id. at *7–8. 
216.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment (“The present 
amendment again reflects the need for continuing and close judicial involvement in 
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deal with the problem of over-discovery,”217 then Sibley would serve 
as one of the first cases of over-discovery reined in by the new Rule 
26(b)(1).218  Many other courts would follow Sibley’s lead, adopting 
not only the words of the new rule, but framing them in the Advisory 
Committee’s intent.219  Two decisions that help to outline and guide 
the application of the new Rule 26(b)(1) were both signed in 
September 2016.220  
 1.    In re Bard IVC Filters Products Liability Litigation  
The first guiding case is Judge David G. Campbell’s decision in In 
re Bard IVC Filters Products Liability Litigation.221  Judge 
Campbell’s decision is not just enlightening because of its analysis, 
but because he is also the Chair of the Advisory Committee on the 
Rules of Civil Procedure that spearheaded and designed the 2015 
amendments.222  The decision focuses on a dispute between the 
parties as to the “discoverability of certain electronically stored 
information . . . generated by foreign entities.”223  Judge Campbell 
breaks his analysis into two parts: relevance and proportionality 
under the new rule.224  As for relevance, the decision reiterates that 
the “reasonably calculated” standard no longer has any bearing on 
discovery.225  The decision continues, in frustration, by listing 
multiple decisions that are still citing to this old standard,226 and even 
points out two decisions that turned to the old standard within the 
Ninth Circuit.227  Judge Campbell concluded that the amended rule 
 
the cases that do not yield readily to the ideal of effective party management. . . .  
[T]here will be important occasions for judicial management, both when the parties 
are legitimately unable to resolve important differences and when the parties fall 
short of effective, cooperative management on their own.”). 
217.  Id.  
218.  See Sibley, 2015 WL 9413101, at *7 (applying the new Rule 26(b)(1) proportionality 
standard in their denial of extensive discovery requests by the plaintiff). 
219.  See, e.g., Arcelormittal Ind. Harbor LLC v. Amex Nooter, LLC, No. 2:15-CV-195-
PRC, 2016 WL 614144, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 16, 2016); Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1791-RCJ-VCF, 2016 WL 526225, at *8 (D. Nev. Feb. 9, 2016); 
Siriano v. Goodman Mfg. Co., L.P., No. 2:14-cv-1131, 2015 WL 8259548, at *6 n.5 
(S.D. Ohio Dec. 9, 2015). 
220.  See infra notes 221–32 and accompanying text. 
221.  317 F.R.D. 562 (D. Ariz. 2016). 
222.  Genetin, supra note 53, at 671. 
223.  In re Bard, 317 F.R.D. at 563.  
224.  Id. at 563–66. 
225.  Id. at 563–64. 
226.  Id. at 564 n.1. 
227.  Id. at 564. 
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abrogated the old standard and any case law created by its 
interpretation.228 
 2.    Cole’s Wexford Hotel, Inc. v. Highmark Inc.  
The second guiding case is Cole’s Wexford Hotel, Inc. v. Highmark 
Inc.229  Cole’s Wexford’s importance in the adoption of the new 
26(b)(1) stems from its comprehensive historical analysis of the rule 
and ultimate conclusion that Oppenheimer is no longer controlling.230  
Cole’s Wexford follows the suggestion by a special master that the 
court deny plaintiffs’ requests for materials concerning approved 
insurance rates and the actual amounts charged by the insurer 
defendant.231  The multi-paged historical breakdown of Rule 26(b), 
followed by an in-depth analysis on the continued application of old 
case law in defining the new Rule 26(b)(1), will hopefully serve as a 
guide to other courts reviewing requests under the new scope.232  
V. HAVE WE ACTUALLY GOTTEN “SOMETHING DONE”?233   
The Duke Conference correctly concluded that amendments to the 
Rules were not the only solution, but must be supplemented with 
education.234  Continued judicial education on Rule 26(b)(1), as well 
as judicial case management, have a major role in correcting the 
Oppenheimer problem.235  But judicial education alone will not be 
enough, and high court guidance is needed to set the scope of 
discovery straight.236 
A. Education and Pilot Programs 
Education and pilot programs are crucial in achieving the goals of 
the amendments.237  Most programs are already underway.238  The 
Duke Conference Report suggested training, drafting manuals, and 
developing practice guides to help facilitate the change.239  Following 
 
228.  See id.  
229.  209 F. Supp. 3d 810 (W.D. Pa. 2016), on reconsideration sub nom. Cole’s Wexford 
Hotel, Inc. v. UPMC, No. 10-1609, 2017 WL 432947 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2017). 
230.  Id. at 817–23. 
231.  Id. at 812. 
232.  See id. at 817–23.  
233.  2015 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.  
234.  2010 DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 84, at 4. 
235.  See id.   
236.  See infra Section V.C. 
237.  2010 DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 84, at 4. 
238.  See infra notes 239–49 and accompanying text. 
239.  2010 DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 84, at 4, 10.  
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the Duke Conference, the Duke Law School Center for Judicial 
Studies published and has maintained its “Guidelines and Practices 
for Implementing the 2015 Discovery Amendments to Achieve 
Proportionality.”240  The American Bar Association Section of 
Litigation partnered with the Duke Law Center for Judicial Studies to 
conduct a seventeen-city series of symposiums, called the “Rules 
Amendments Roadshow,” to help educate the bench and bar on the 
amendments.241  In addition to the symposium series, the Roadshow 
provided resources concerning the amendments on their website, and 
even created podcasts.242  Moreover, the Federal Judicial Center 
continues to conduct workshops on the discovery amendments.243 
Multiple pilot programs to test new ideas on case management and 
discovery are growing and more district judges are heeding the call of 
the Supreme Court to participate.244  Two pilot programs were 
unanimously recommended by the Committee on Rules of Practice 
and Procedure to be sent to the Judicial Conference for approval.245  
The first is a Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot Program, which will 
“test a system of mandatory initial discovery requests to be adopted 
in each participating court.”246  The second is the Expedited 
Procedures Pilot Program, designed to increase judicial education and 
use of procedural and logistical tools to increase the speed of 
litigation.247  Both programs began in spring 2017 and will last for 
 
240.  See, e.g., Duke Law Ctr. for Judicial Studies, Guidelines and Practices for 
Implementing the 2015 Discovery Amendments to Achieve Proportionality, 
JUDICATURE, Winter 2015, at 47, 49; Duke Law Ctr. for Judicial Studies, Revised 
Guidelines & Practices for Implementing the 2015 Discovery Amendments to 
Achieve Proportionality, JUDICATURE, Winter 2016, at 21, 21–22. 
241.  See Hello “Proportionality,” Goodbye “Reasonably Calculated”: Reinventing Case 
Management and Discovery Under the 2015 Civil Rules Amendments, RULES 
AMENDMENTS ROADSHOW, http://www.frcpamendments2015.org/ (last visited Nov. 
11, 2017). 
242.      Id.; Resources, RULES AMENDMENTS ROADSHOW, http://www.frcpamendments2015.
org/resources.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
243.  See Minutes of the June 6, 2016, Meeting of the Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, in COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE JANUARY 2017 
AGENDA BOOK 23, 31–32 (2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017-
01-standing-agenda_book_0.pdf. 
244.  See JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2016 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7 
(2016), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2016year-endreport.pdf.  
245.  Minutes of the June 6, 2016, Meeting of the Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, supra note 243, at 31.  
246.  Id.  
247.  See id. 
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three years.248  So far, ten districts have expressed some degree of 
interest in one or both of the pilot programs.249  Despite the multiple 
educational opportunities, the impact seems curbed and 
misapplications continue.250 
B. A Curbed Impact 
Although it is incredibly difficult to definitively say, the new Rule 
26(b)(1) seems to be narrowing the scope of discovery.251  A 
comprehensive analysis of the first six months of proportionality 
provided many insights into application of the new Rule 26(b)(1).252  
First, as time progressed, so did the frequency of proportionality 
analyses.253  In the first two months of proportionality, the concept 
was only reviewed in thirty-five cases.254  After 180 days of 
proportionality, 142 opinions had applied the concept.255  That is a 
three-fold increase in application.256  Such an increase could have 
several explanations; one possibility is that the timeframe has 
allowed for more parties to brief the issue of proportionality.257  
Another explanation may be that the longer the proportionality is 
controlling, the more familiar the bench and bar will become with the 
concept, and the more likely the bench will be to frame their 
decisions using a proportionality lens.258  
Second, despite increased application of proportionality, available 
data suggests a minimal increase in discovery restrictions under the 
concept.259  One report by the Federal Litigator suggests that 
 
248.  Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, in COMMITTEE ON RULES OF 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE JANUARY 2017 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 243, at 49, 63. 
249.  Report of the Subcommittee on Pilot Projects, in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL 
RULES NOVEMBER 2016 AGENDA BOOK 205, 209 (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/si
tes/default/files/2016-11-civil-agenda_book_0.pdf.  The ten districts are the Eastern 
District of Kentucky, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Western District of Michigan, 
Southern District of Ohio, District of Arizona, Northern District of Illinois, Southern 
District of Texas, Eastern District of Louisiana, Northern District of Texas, and the 
District of Montana.  Id. at 209. 
250.  See infra Sections V.B–C.  
251.  See supra Section III.A. 
252.  See Six-Month Update on Proportionality, FED. LITIGATOR, Oct. 2016, at 7, paras. 1–
2.  
253.  Id. at paras. 6–7. 
254.  Id. at para. 6. 
255.  Id. at para. 8. 
256.  See id. at paras. 6, 8. 
257.  See id. at para. 9. 
258.  Id. at paras. 9–10. 
259.  Id. at paras. 6, 8. 
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proportionality is not making the “splash” many foresaw.260  Taking a 
six-month sample size of federal discovery decisions pre-amendment, 
the report found that courts restricted at least one aspect of discovery 
in 56% of cases.261  Post-amendment, courts have restricted some 
aspect of a discovery request in just 61% of cases.262  Despite 
arguably drastic alterations to the scope of discovery, in the first six 
months, courts have only narrowed discovery by 5%.263  So while 
some cases are likely being decided differently under the new 
standard, the impact has not been as large as expected.264   
The difficulty is that one cannot determine if courts are truly 
reaching different results because of proportionality, or are just 
reaching the same result as they would have prior to the amendments, 
but for different reasons.265  Furthermore, the extent of the rule 
remains unknown because data concerning the time and costs of 
litigation are unavailable.  But one thing is certain, while invocation 
of proportionality has not drastically altered the scope of 
discovery,266 its impact has also been hindered by the continued use 
of old case law defining a broad scope of relevance.267  
C. Guidance from Above 
Despite the educational programming and perceived narrowing of 
the scope of discovery,268 Rule 26(b)(1) has yet to achieve its full 
potential.269  Slow institutional progression of the judiciary and 
educational programming aside, one thing is certain—the continued 
use of old case law defining a broad scope of discovery will hinder 
success.270  Proportionality needs the aid of the appellate courts.  As 
of right now, the “relevance” and “proportionality” standards of the 
new Rule 26(b)(1) are dichotomously applied.271  Old case law 
 
260.  Id. at paras. 1, 5–6. 
261.  Id. at para. 8. 
262.  Id. 
263.  Id. at paras. 3–5, 8. 
264.  See id. at paras. 5–6, 8. 
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266.  See supra notes 259–64 and accompanying text. 
267.  See supra Sections IV.A–B. 
268.  See supra Sections V.A–B. 
269.  See supra Sections IV.A–B, V.B.  It would be unrealistic to have expected a full 
realization of potential in such a short period of time.  See Six-Month Update on 
Proportionality, supra note 252, at para. 9 (noting that the effect of the amendments 
may be more noticeable once they are “less fresh and in the forefront of everyone’s 
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270.  See supra Sections IV.A–B. 
271.  See supra Sections III.A, IV.A–C. 
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details “relevance” as broad and liberal.272  But proportionality is 
fluid, both restricting and broad depending on the case.273  The 
Advisory Committee did not intend a disjointed application, but 
designed the new Rule to focus discovery and ultimately reduce 
costs.274  This sentiment becomes most apparent in Judge Campbell’s 
In re Bard decision.275  If the Advisory Committee intended for 
Oppenheimer to retain its control over the scope of discovery, the 
Chairman would have utilized the holding.276  Instead, Judge 
Campbell dismissed the use of Oppenheimer as an “[o]ld habit[]” and 
cited to ten cases that incorrectly used the old case law in August 
2016 alone.277   
The courts, however, should not be solely faulted for this 
misapplication.  Many factors could have led to this 
misapplication,278 but perhaps the most obvious is the silence of the 
Advisory Committee’s notes.  The notes detail proportionality and 
the removed standards, but provide little guidance on “relevance” 
under the new 26(b)(1).279  The silence inevitably led courts to case 
law.  Judicial education is key in proper application, but the full 
intent of the Advisory Committee will not be realized until new case 
law is created.280  Until higher courts determine if Oppenheimer and 
its ilk are still applicable, the split in Rule 26(b)(1)’s application will 
continue to grow.  And as the split grows, the Rule’s full effect on 
costs and time will remain unfulfilled.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
Proportionality is making inroads, but its full potential to rein in 
costs and time remains unknown.  On one hand, there has not been 
enough time to gather meaningful data on any impact to the cost or 
time of discovery.281  But on the other, one does not need data to 
determine the hurdle inhibiting the intended narrowing.  Cases like 
Oppenheimer, that define relevance through the language of the 
former Rule 26(b)(1), provide for a broad and liberal scope of 
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discovery.282  The inclusion of proportionality and the removal of 
former standards in the new Rule 26(b)(1) were all in an effort to 
narrow the scope of discovery.283   
For better or for worse, the Advisory Committee intended the new 
rule to narrow the scope of discovery.284  Continued education of the 
bench and bar will foster the needed environment for the new scope 
to take hold,285 but at the end of the day the reasons why Chief 
Justice Roberts’s analogized litigators to duelers still exist.286  As 
long as litigators can still argue that “relevance” is very broad, they 
will.  The continued use of the old case law by the district courts will 
only fuel this debate and will hopefully expedite this question’s 
inevitable determination by the appellate courts.  Without this 
necessary guidance, the split will grow and the full potential of Rule 
26(b)(1) will remain lost.  
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